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COMMENTS
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION
INTRODUCTION

Ever since Merryweather v. Nixan' was decided almost two
centuries ago, the principle that "as between joint tortfeasors,
there is no right of contribution ' 2 has been almost hornbook law.
Basically, contribution is an equitable concept which provides for
the equalization of financial burdens and the fair division of
losses between tortfeasors. Therefore:
[O]ne who is compelled to pay or satisfy the whole or to bear
more than his just share of a common burden or obligation, upon
which several persons are equally liable or which they are bound
obtain from [the others] payment of
to discharge, ... [may]
3
their respective shares.

While the published report of Merryweather is somewhat
sketchy, it is apparent that the rule against contribution had a
solid foundation both in logic and in equity. Faced in Merryweather with an action for conversion wherein two defendants
had acted in concert, Lord Kenyon denied one defendant's request for "contribution of a moiety" from the other. Since the
parties had acted voluntarily, intentionally, and in concert, and
were therefore joint tortfeasors, the act of one was the act of
the other in the eyes of the law and each was considered guilty
4
of the whole deliberate wrong.
Unfortunately, the term "joint tortfeasors" has come to mean
many things to many courts, and sometimes different things to
the same court. The failure to distinguish the various senses in
which the term has been used has led to substantial uncertainty
and confusion. 5 Often the courts misapply the term to defendants who have been "joined" but who were not "joint" tortfeasors
as the word "joint" was used in the era of Merryweather.6 Consequently, when the equities clearly favor one "joined" tort8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
Annot., 60 A,L.R.2d 1366, 1368 (1958). The rule is sometimes
"in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis."
18 AM. Jur. 2d, Contribution,§ 1 (1965).
4. PnossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw or TORTS, 305 (4th ed. 1971).

1.
2.
stated:
3.

[hereinafter cited as PROSSER, TORTS].

5. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25
(1937).
6. See text accompanying notes 16-26 infra.

CALIF.

L. Rzv. 413
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feasor, the courts today will sometimes allow partial indemnity,
equitable apportionment,8 or subrogation 9 in order to circumvent
the rule against contribution among "joint" tortfeasors.
While it is generally believed that no contribution is ever allowed in any case in Illinois, 10 this belief is largely based on dictum or on a misconstruction of terms and a lack of research.
The question of whether contribution is allowed in Illinois is far
from settled.1 ' Two recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions
clearly demonstrate the need for clarification or explanation of
the rule regarding contribution and its exceptions. In Gertz v.
Campbell' 2 the court approved the appellate court's application
of the doctrine of "equitable apportionment" among successive
tortfeasors. Subsequently, in Carver v. Grossman,"3 the court
denied indemnity between two concurrent tortfeasors, noting
that while the rationale for the Illinois rule against contribution
has been severely questioned, the issue of whether the time was
ripe for a judicial modification of the rule without legislative en4
actment was irrelevant to the case at bar.'
Judicial modification of the rule is probably not necessary,
nor is legislative action. What is needed is a judicial explanation
of the rule and a definition of its terms. "Joint" must be distinguished from "joined," and "contribution" must be distinguished
from "indemnity."
In the past, several respected authors have indicated that
contribution is probably allowed in Illinois." Undoubtedly this
view would gain wider acceptance if the confusion in terminology
were ended. The introduction of such concepts as equitable apportionment and partial indemnity as substitutes for, or alternatives to, contribution distorts the law. Contribution should be
denied only when the tortfeasors are joint. When they are not,
contribution should be allowed, and it should be called by its
proper name.
7. Indemnity was allowed "[t]o combat the harshness of a rule pro-

hibiting contribution among tortfeasors in all cases" in Spivack v. Hara,
69 Ill.
24, 216 N.E.2d
173, 3d
174806,
(1966).
8. App.
Gertz2dv.22,
Campbell,
4 Ill. App.
282 N.E.2d 28 (1972).
9. Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973), Chief Justice Underwood, specially concurring; Fisher v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. &
Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269 (1920).
10. Gertz v. Campbell, 4 Ill. App. 3d 806, 282 N.E.2d 28 (1972), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). See also Geborek v. Briggs Transp. Co., 139 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1956); Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958).
11. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1373 (1958).
12. 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 4
Ill. App. 3d 806, 282 N.E.2d 28 (1972).
13. 55 Ill. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973).
14. Id. at 510-11, 305 N.E.2d at 162-63.
15. Proehl, Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors, 49 ILL. B.J. 880
(1961); Kissel, A Second Look At Third Party Practice,46 CHi. BAR REC.
419 (1965).
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This article will first define and explain the terminology
used, and trace the history and development of the rule. It will
then analyze the Gertz and Carver decisions to show that in
neither case were the tortfeasors joint and therefore contribution
per se could have been allowed.
"JOINT" V. "JOINDER"

THE NEED FOR PRECISE LANGUAGE
Originally "joint tort" meant "vicarious liability for concerted action." 16 Persons acting in concert to commit a trespass
were considered joint venturers and were liable for the entire
result of their actions.' 7 Also it was frequently held that
those who actively participate in the wrongful act, by cooperation
or request, or who lend aid, encouragement or countenance to
the wrongdoer, or approval to his acts done for their benefit are
equally liable with him. Express agreement is not necessary;
all that is required is that there shall be a common design or
understanding. I s
Since the act involved a common purpose and mutual aid, the
"act of one is the act of all"' 9 and the jury was not allowed to
20
apportion the damages.
In the time of Merryweather, "joinder of defendants" was
also limited to cases of concerted action, where a mutual agency
might be found. 2' Consequently, when defendants did not act
in concert and/or the case did not involve the doctrine of respond22
eat superior,
the defendants could not be sued jointly even though the acts
that they had committed were identical in character and the combined effect of 23
their acts was to cause a single, indivisible injury
to the plaintiff.
Thus when Lord Kenyon determined in Merryweather that there
could be no contribution among joint tortfeasors, his words had a
precise and narrow meaning. His joint tortfeasors were two men
who had committed a "joint tort" by acting in concert and giving
mutual aid, and thus were properly "joined as defendants."
The early American cases adopted this position, refusing to
permit joinder of defendants in the absence of concerted action,
16. PROSSER, TORTS, 291.

17. Id.

18. Prosser, supra note 5, at 429-30.
19. PROSSER, TORTS, 291 citing Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5,
77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).

20. Id.
21. Id. at 293.
22. Even without concerted action a master and servant could be

joined because each was responsible for the same act. Prosser, supra
note 5, at 414.
23. Wright v. Royse, 43 Ill. App. 2d 267, 277, 193 N.E.2d 340, 345
(1963).
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or mutual responsibility for the same act.24 But with the advent
25
of procedural codes in the United States in the mid-1800's, the
terms "joint" and "joinder" lost their relative synonymity. Joinder no longer depended on concert of action. It became, instead,
a procedural convenience which allowed the courts to combine
many parties and issues arising from one incident into one trial,
26
Unforas long as the rights of the parties were not prejudiced.
was
change
the
that
tunately, the courts failed to recognize
merely procedural and that rules of law regarding "joint" tortfeasors did not necessarily apply to tortfeasors who could now
be "joined" procedurally in the same action. This failure laid the
foundation for the confusion concerning proper application of the
rule against contribution which exists today.
ENTIRE LIABILITY

Another common law principle, which evolved quite apart
from the question of joinder of defendants, also contributed to
the confusion. As this principle developed, a tortfeasor became
liable for the entire loss sustained by the plaintiff even though
the tortfeasor's act concurred or combined with that of another
wrongdoer to produce the injury. The rationale behind the principle was that the defendant should be liable for all consequences
27
proximately caused by his wrongful act.
In England, such concurrent but independent tortfeasors
were never confused with "joint" tortfeasors because, without
28
concerted action, they could not be joined in the same action.
They had to be sued separately, and each might be liable for the
entire loss. However,
[u]nder the more liberal American rules as to joinder, defendants
whose negligence has concurred to produce a single result have
been joined in one action, and have become at once, by careless
usage 'joint tortfeasors.' One immediate result has been to confuse joinder of parties with liability for entire damages ....29
It has been said that the "so-called 'rule' against contribution, where it exists at all, is due to a historical mistake,"3 0 and
also that
a rule intended to apply only to tortfeasors acting intentionally
and in concert was thoughtlessly allowed to come in also to
24. Prosser, supra note 5, at 415.
25. The Field Code of Procedure came into effect in New York in
1848.
26. PROSSER,TORTS, 294.

27. Id. at 297.
28. Id. at 297-98.
29. Prosser, supra note 5, at 420.
30. Kissel, supra note 15, at 425. The RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
is slightly more charitable. At comment a to § 102 the Restaters note

that the rule is "explainable only on historical grounds."
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plague negligent actors where the damages were indivisible.
31
Procedure was thus allowed to alter the substantive law.
The failure of the courts to clearly distinguish between joint liability and joint tort thus accounts for many misapplications of
the rule.
INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
SOME ELEMENTARY DEFINITIONS

Before discussing case law regarding contribution it is necessary to clearly distinguish the concepts of indemnity and contribution, since these terms are often confused.3 2 Contribution
"distributes the loss among the tort-feasors by requiring each to
pay his proportionate share, '3 3 while indemnity "shifts the entire
loss from one tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay it to the
shoulders of another who should bear it instead. '34 Indemnity
arises from contract, either express or implied; contribution is
founded on principles of equality and equity.3 5 The distinction
6
is probably best illustrated by Selz, Schwab & Co. v. Guthman,3
an early Illinois case, in which several creditors had the sheriff
levy on their debtor's property. The levy proved to be wrongful
and the debtor obtained judgment against the sheriff. The court
held that the innocent sheriff (agent) was entitled to indemnity
from the creditors (principals), presumably on the theory of implied contract; the creditor who indemnified the sheriff would
then be entitled to contribution from the other creditors.
Indemnity was originally applied when the liability of the
prospective indemnitee arose only as a matter of law, such as a
master's liability for the torts of his servant, rather than by the
indemnitee's own overt physical act. Eventually the master came
to be thought of as the "passive" tortfeasor and the servant as
the "active" tortfeasor. Gradually the courts eliminated the requirement of an actual contractual relationship (i.e., master-servant, principal-agent) and found an implied contract of indemnity
31.

Proehl, supra note 15, at 882.

32. "It may be noted that the courts are not always careful in their

use of the terms 'contribution' and 'indemnity.'" Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d
1366, 1369 n.6 (1958).
33. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 624, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188
(1965), citing PRossER, LAW OF Tours, ch. 8 (3d ed. 1964).
Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 639, 640-41 (1966).

See also

34. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 624, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188
(1965). The distinction is also drawn at Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1369
(1958) and 13 AM. JuR., Contribution§ 2.
35. Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 639, 640-41 states that contribution
is distinguishable from [indemnity] in that while indemnity springs
from contract express or implied, the doctrine of contribution is not
founded on contract, but is based on the principle that equality of
burden as to a common right is equity, and that wherever there is
a common right, the burden is also common.
36. 62 IlM. App. 624 (1896). See Comment, 19 U. Cm. L. REV. 388, 392
n.20 (1952).
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between tortfeasors. Thus when the courts could find a "measurable degree of difference between joint tortfeasors... [they]
permitted indemnity claims by the less culpable indemnitee
against the more culpable indemnitor. '8 7 In Carver the court
stated that
[w]here indemnity has been allowed the conduct of the indemnitor has usually been characterized as the primary cause or active

negligence while that of the indemnitee has38 been characterized
as the secondary cause or passive negligence.
While the allowance of indemnity in "active-passive" negligence cases has led some authors and courts to refer to indemnity
as an exception to the rule against contribution, s9 the two concepts are not directly related and arise on different sets of facts.
A strict application of the rule against contribution and a liberal
interpretation of the requirements for "active-passive" indemnity
tends to create anomalous decisions, in that a less negligent tortfeasor can recover full damages through indemnity from his cotortfeasors, but he cannot recover a part of the damages through
contribution. 40 This has led one author to propose that
[a]n enlightened Illinois court ... dispel the confusion produced

by intermingling the terms indemnity and contribution and
award indemnity only where
one party is without fault and con41
tribution in all other cases.
For clarification, indemnity as used in this article means the
entire shifting of liability from one whose liability arose as a matter of law, or by contract, to one whose direct, overt act caused
the injury. Contribution will mean an equitable sharing of a liability between parties whose acts, whether independent or not,
combined to cause injury to a third party.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE IN ILLINOIS

The early cases in the United States applied the rule against

42
contribution to instances of wilful or intentional misconduct,

37. Feirich, Third Party Practice, 1967 U. ILL. L. F. 236, 246 (1967).
See, e.g., Drell v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 57 Ill. App. 2d 129,
207 N.E.2d 101 (1965); Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d
334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964); Rovekamp v. Central Constr. Co., 45 Ill. App.
2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 756 (1964); Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill. App.
2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808 (1962).

38. Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1973)
(citations omitted), citing Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. v. Evans Constr.
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
39. "[T] here is an exception to the general rule prohibiting contribution among tortfeasors where the indemnitee is guilty only of passive
negligence and the indemnitor is guilty of active negligence." Feirich,
supra note 37, at 247.
40. Comment, 19 U. CHi. L. REv. 388, 399 (1952).
41. Id. at 400; accord, Feirich, supra note 37, at 247; Kissel, supra note
15, at 425.
42. Prosser, supra note 5, at 426-27, citing Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind. 248
(1857); Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige (N.Y.) 18 (1844); Peck v. Ellis, 2
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but refused to recognize it in cases of torts resulting from negligence or mistake.4 3 Today, a majority of American jurisdictions
apply the rule to negligent tortfeasors,4544 but the minority, allowing contribution, seems to be growing.
The status of the rule in Illinois is not entirely clear,46 and
Illinois cases have been cited as supporting both the majority and
the minority rules-sometimes in the same article. 47 Several authors have stated that the no-contribution rule has never been
squarely addressed by an Illinois court.48 Basically, this author
agrees. An analysis of some of the major Illinois decisions will
expose the extent of the confusion surrounding the rule against
contribution among joint tortfeasors in Illinois. The following
discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, and it should be noted
that many of the cases are analyzed only to show that they are
not properly contribution cases.
The rule of no contribution was first stated in 1856 in Nelson
v. Cook, 49 which involved a wrongful levy on a debtor's property.
The court there stated: "The principle laid down in Merryweather v. Nixan ... that there is no right of contribution as

between tort-feasors, or trespassers, has been, and still is, recognized as unquestionable law."50 This statement, however, was
only dictum and was made simply to reinforce the subsequent
point that such a rule does not affect the right of indemnity
where it exists. 51
A few years later, the problem of contribution again arose
52
in the courts. In Rend v. Chicago West Division Railway Co.
Johns Ch. (N.Y.) 131 (1816); accord, Reath, Contributions Between Persons Jointly Charged For Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv.

L. REv. 176, 182 (1898).

43. Prosser, supra note 5, at 426-27, citing Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn.
455 (1859); Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203 (1853); Horback v. Elder,
18 Pa. 33 (1851).

44. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1371 (.1958); accord, RESTATEVIENT OF
which states in section 102:
Where two persons acting independently or jointly, have negligently injured a third person or his property for which injury both
ecome liable in tort to the third person, one of them who has made
expenditures in the discharge of their liability is not entitled to contribution from the other.
45. Annot. 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1377 (1958).
46. Id. at 1374 n.2.

RESTITUTION

47. Compare Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d at 1374 n.2 with 1377-78 n.1l.
48. Proehi, supra note 15, at 891: "IT]he question has never been
squarely submitted to an appellate court. The weight of dicta in Illinois

cases would seem to favor contribution." Comment, supra note 40, at
391: "[I]n the negligence category, under which most contribution cases
would be expected to arise, no direct Illinois precedents exist." Cf. Kissel, supra note 15, at 425.
49. 17 Ill. 443 (1856).
50. Id. at 448. The law is misstated in that Merryweather involved
not just tortfeasors, but joint, intentionaL tortfeasors.
51. This "dicta caused far greater confusion than clarification."
Proehl, supra note 15, at 885-86.
52. 8 Ill. App. 517 (1881).
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a wagon and a horse car collided, injuring a passenger in the
horse car. Plaintiff, owner of the horse car, sued to recover the
amount paid in damages to the passenger. The court held that
if the injury resulted from the joint operation of the negligence
of both drivers, neither could recover from the other since "[t] he
law will enforce no contribution as between joint tort-feasors."53
While it has been said that Rend really involved indemnity, 54 the
holding is also explainable in terms of contribution. The drivers
of both the wagon and the horse car were racing to be the first
,across a Chicago bridge, exchanging epithets periodically. Such
conduct could be considered "intentional" in that it involved a
reckless disregard of safety, or "concerted action" arising from
a tacit agreement of the drivers to race. 5 Under either interpretation, the drivers, and hence their masters, would truly be "joint
tortfeasors" as the term was used at English common law and
contribution would be properly denied.
In the same year as Rend was decided, the appellate court
stated in Goldsborough v. Darst"6 that "there are so many exceptions to the rule [against contribution] that it has ceased to be
a general one."'57 The court then proceeded to allow contribution
between two wrongdoers who had fraudulently attempted to acquire property through a foreclosure sale, even though the "entire transaction [bore] the impress of collusion between the appellees. '5 8 Thus contribution was allowed between intentional
tortfeasors acting in concert.
The first extensive discussion by the Illinois Supreme Court
of the rule against contribution and its ramifications appeared
in 1889 in Farwell v. Becker. 9 After considering authority from
various jurisdictions,6" the court concluded that the rule against
contribution applies only where there has been an intentional
violation of the law or where the wrongdoer must be presumed
to have known that the act was unlawful. In explaining the
proper interpretation of the rule against contribution the court
quoted, inter alia, STORY ON PARTNERSHIP: "[the rule applies]
where the tort is a known, meditated wrong;" 1 Bailey v. Bussing:
53. Id. at 525.
54. Proehl, supra note 15, at 886 n.29; accord, Comment, supra note
40, at 392-93. The case is probably considered one for indemnity only
because plaintiff was suing for a full reimbursement rather than an apportionment of damages.
55. See PRossER, TORTS 292.
56. 9 Ill. App. 205 (1881).

57. Id. at 211.
58. Id. at 214.
59. 129 Ill. 261 (1889) (involving a wrongful levy on a debtor's property).
60. Id. at 271-72, where the court discussed Bailey v. Bussing, 28
Conn. 455 (1859), Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203 (1853), and Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. St. 218 (1870).

61. 129 Ill. 261, 270-71 (1889).
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"[the rule] applies properly only to cases where there has been
an intentional violation of the law, or where the wrongdoer is
presumed to have known that the act was unlawful; ' 62 and Acheson v. Miller: "it only applies to cases where the persons have
engaged together in doing, wantonly or knowingly, a wrong." 68
While there is some dispute over whether this language is
dictum, 64 both the opinion itself and the authorities cited leave
no doubt as to the court's belief that the rule of no contribution
was limited to cases in which wilfulness or malice was present. 65
In Wanack v. Michels,66 the Illinois Supreme Court denied
a demand by the surety on a dram shop bond for contribution
from the owner of the building housing the tavern. The court
stated that "[i] t is a general rule that there is no right of contribution as between tort feasors ... [but] this rule is only applied
to cases of intentional and conscious wrongdoing. ' 67 The court
held that by knowingly leasing a building for use as a dram shop,
the owner exhibits "intent" and there can be no contribution
among intentional (joint) tortfeasors. 68
In John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co.6 9
a general contractor was seeking reimbursement for damages
paid for injuries caused by the subcontractor's negligence.
Though the case is often cited as supporting the rule against contribution,7' 0 the suit was based on an express contract of indem62. Id. at 271.
63. Id. at 272.
64. "Farwell v. Becker offers only dictum in support of the contention
that contribution can be had." Proehl, supra note 15, at 887. This conclusion is arguably incorrect. While one defendant was dismissed on a
jurisdictional point, the court said of the other defendant: "We think the
decree of the circuit court holding Becker liable to contribute was correct." 129 Ill. 261, 273 (1889). Since the holding that contribution was

allowed in some cases was the basis of the reversal, the discussion of
contribution should in no way be considered dicta.
65. Proehl, supra note 15, at 886.
66. 215 Ill. 87, 74 N.E. 84 (1905).
67. Id. at 94, 74 N.E. at 87, citing Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (1856).

68. While the result is correct, the court might more properly have

considered this an indemnity case, with the contractual surety standing

in the shoes of the bar operator. Since the surety would then be consid-

ered the "active" tortfeasor, he logically could not be indemnified by the
"passive" building operator whose statutory liability arose by operation

of the Dram Shop Act.
69. 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 793 (1923).

70. The case is cited in Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1374 (1958), as indicating that Illinois applies the common law rule to negligent tortfeasors.

Other cases sometimes improperly cited for the rule against contribution are: Rylander v. Chicago Short Line Ry., 17 Ill. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d
812 (1959) (Proehl, supra note 15, at 891 n.50 noted that: "No question
of contribution was involved, since no common liability existed, the em-

ployer being liable under Workmen's Compensation and the third party
under common law.")

Pennsylvania Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250

Ill. App. 330 (1928) (railroad suing to recover damages paid to its fireman for injuries resulting from the negligence of defendant, a contractor
hired by the railroad).
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nity, and therefore any reference to contribution in the opinion
would be clearly dictum. In Griffiths the court stated that
"where two parties acting together commit an illegal or wrongful
act," 17 neither can recover from the other the damages paid. The
rule as stated is accurate since tortfeasors acting in concert have
never beeen allowed contribution. However, negligent tortfeasors cannot properly be considered as acting in concert, even
72
though their acts may combine to cause one indivisible injury.
In Skala v. Lehon 78 the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
It is true, as a general rule, that the right of contribution
does not exist as between joint tort feasors where there is concerted action in the commission of the wrong. Where, however,
there is no concerted action the rule does not apply, as the
parties in such case are not in pari delicto as to each other, and
as between themselves their rights may be adjusted in accordance
with the principles of law applicable to the relation in fact exist74
ing between them.
While Skala is often cited for the rule against contribution, unfortunately, as in Griffiths, the court's discussion of contribu75
tion is only dictum.
Further, the court's use of "in pari delicto"76 has been criticized 7 7 because historically the application of the rule was only
dependent on "intent" or "concert of action," and within these
confines, relative fault was immaterial. Subsequent cases, however, have interpreted the phrase as meaning that the parties
78
have not acted intentionally or in concert.
71. 310 Ill. 331, 339, 141 N.E. 739, 742 (1923) (emphasis added).
72. See text at notes 23 and 145-49.
73. 343 Ill. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931).
74. Id. at 605, 175 N.E. at 833.
75. The issue on appeal was whether a master and a servant could
be jointly charged as tortfeasors, and whether, consequently, a subsequent amendment deleting the servant as a defendant, constituted a new
cause of action, thus violating the Statute of Limitations.
76. The "in pari delicto" qualification has appeared several times in
Illinois case law, most notably in dicta in two 1962 indemnity cases. In
Holcomb v. Flavin, 37 Ill. App. 2d 359, 362, 185 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1962)
the court said: "Contribution among tort-feasors is permissible and can
be enforced so long as the parties do not stand in pari delicto." In Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill. App. 2d 12, 18, 184 N.E.2d 808, 811
(1962) the court said: " [T] he Illinois rule against contribution or indemnification among joint tort feasors does not extend to the situation where
the parties were not acting in pari delicto." In neither case was it particularly clear what exactly the court meant by the phrase, nor was it
clear at what qualitative or quantitative level of fault of one party would
the parties no longer be "in equal fault." See also, Bohannon v. Joseph
T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App. 2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602 (1958); Pennsylvania Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250 Ill. App. 330 (1928).
77. Proehl, supra note 15, at 888-89.
78. McDonald v. Trampf, 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 119, 198 N.E.2d 537, 544
(1964):
[W]hen the courts say that the parties are not in pari delicto as to
each other, and therefore the passive tortfeasor can collect against
the active tortfeasor, it means that the parties have not intentionally
and concertedly committed a wrongful act.
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While Aldridge v. Morris,79 a 1949 case, has been cited for the

proposition that Illinois follows the no-contribution rule,80 the
court's holding in that case had the practical effect of allowing
contribution. Defendant, driver of a vehicle in which plaintiff's
decedent was killed, contended that any judgment against him
should be reduced by the amount paid by an oil company to the
plaintiff for a covenant not to sue. The oil company's truck had
started into an intersection and had been hit by the auto driven
by the defendant. The court first stated that
[w]hile it is elementary that contribution by joint tortfeasors
will not be enforced and that each is liable for the full damage
on the ground that the law will not undertake to adjust the burdens of misconduct, it is an equally well-established precept of
justice that a person is entitled to only one satisfaction for an
injury.8 '
The court in Aldridge then allowed the deduction of the
amount paid for the covenant, rationalizing that "the court
would not be adjusting the burdens of misconduct, but merely
",82
assuring a single recovery for the damages sustained ....
Nevertheless, the practical effect of the decision was an appor8 3
tionment of damages between two negligent tortfeasors.
In Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co.,8 4 the plaintiff railroad had settled a claim by an em-

ployee who had been injured when he was caught between plaintiff's train and defendant's truck. The trial court had dismissed
the complaint "undoubtedly . . . on the supposition that the railroad was a tort-feasor seeking contribution from another and
therefore could not recover on its theory of implied indemnity." ' 5
In reversing the dismissal the appellate court said:
[W]here the offense is merely malum prohibitum and is in no
respect immoral, it is not against the policy of the law to inquire into the relative delinquency of the parties and to administer justice between them although both parties are wrongdoers.8 6

Since plaintiff was seeking full reimbursement for monies paid,
79. 337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N.E. 143 (1949).
80. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958).
81. 337 Ill. App. 369, 375-76, 86 N.E. 143, 146 (1949).
82. Id. at 381, 143 N.E. at 149.
83. The case is criticized in Proehl, supranote 15, at 889-90.
84. 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951).
85. Id. at 152, 98 N.E. at 785.
86. Id. at 158, 98 N.E. at 788. The "malum prohibitum" rule first
appeared in Illinois in Chicago Rys. v. R.F. Conway Co., 219 Ill.
App. 220 (1920), an indemnity case. There the court said at 223:
'If the parties are not equally criminal, the principal delinquent may
be held responsible to his co delinquent for damages incurred by
their joint offense. In respect to offenses, in which is involved any
moral delinquency or turpitude, all parties are deemed equally
guilty, and courts will not inquire into their relative guilt. But
where the offense is merely malum prohibitum. .. .'
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the court's statethe action was one for indemnity, and again,
87
ment is only dictum in regard to contribution.
Sometimes a simple misinterpretation of the rule, or the substitution of one word for another in the mistaken belief that the
two are synonymous, ultimately leads to a wholly improper result, as in Coffey v. ABC Liquor Stores.8 8 In that case, a liquor
store and several tavern owners had filed a third party complaint
against one of their customers who, after becoming intoxicated,
had injured the plaintiff Coffey. The Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the third party complaint
"since on principle, indemnity or contribution or subrogation is
allowed only to innocent parties. 8 9 The court cited Wanack v.
Michels9" and Geneva Const. Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage
Co. 9 1 but neither case spoke in terms of "innocent parties. '92 Re-

covery should have been allowed in Coffey, probably under some
theory of indemnity.93
McDonald v. Trampf,9 4 though arguably a case dealing with
indemnity rather than contribution," contains the most extensive review of the law on contribution since Farwell. In McDonald, a drunken driver, 96 who had paid damages to the party
he had injured, sought partial reimbursement from the tavern
owners who had sold him the liquor. After discussing the leading Illinois cases dealing with contribution 97 the court seemed to
87. The factual situation was such, however, that contribution may
have been more appropriate than indemnity. See Proehl, supra note 15,
at 889 n.44, citing Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeagors, 11 U. FLA. L.
REV. 175 (1958).
88. 13 Ill. App. 2d 510, 142 N.E.2d 705 (1957).
89. Id. at 514, 142 N.E.2d at 707.
90. 215 Ill. 87, 74 N.E. 84 (1905).
91. 4 Ill. 2d 273, 122 N.E.2d 540 (1954).
92. The court in Wanack denied contribution between two tortfeasors
who they found had acted with intent (see text accompanying note 68
supra), and "innocent" is certainly not the opposite of "intentional." In
Geneva, the prospective indemnitee was considered "passive," not "innocent."
93. Indemnity should have been allowed either because the liquor
dealers' liability arose only by operation of law (i.e., the Dram Shop
Act) after some overt act by another, or on the theory that the liquor
dealers were "passive" tortfeasors while the customer was "active." The
result seems terribly inequitable because the primary wrongdoer was not
held liable.
94. 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 198 N.E.2d 537 (1964).
95. The usual indemnity case would have the "passive" tavern owners, whose potential liability arises as a matter of law under the Dram
Shop Act suing the "active" tortfeasor, the driver. Even though the parties are reversed, normal indemnity principles should still apply, and the
driver's third party complaint was properly dismissed. See also note 114

infra.

96. The third party complaint was actually brought by the driver's
insurance company as subrogee.
97. Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931); John Griffiths
& Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923);
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App.
148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951); Pennsylvania Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co.,
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agree with the Griffiths court that "contribution or indemnity
would be denied only among joint tortfeasors who acted concertedly and intentionally."9 8 While the court found that the third
party plaintiff and defendants had not acted either intentionally
or in concert, contribution was denied since "[a] s the driver of
the car that injured the plaintiff, Trampf is the active tortfeasor
and therefore cannot seek reimbursement from the tavern operators or their insurers." 99 Thus, after an extensive discussion of
contribution, the court used indemnity language (i.e., "active
tortfeasor") to decide the case. 100
As the above cases indicate, one of the primary causes of the
confusion surrounding the rule against contribution in Illinois is
the frequent failure of many courts to either be precise in their
use of terms or to define the terms used. Consequently, when
a court states that "in jurisdictions like this one, in which contribution among joint tortfeasors is not allowed,"' 0 ' and fails to
either define "joint tortfeasor" or state the various exceptions to
the rule, 0 2 a reader or researcher may be left with the erroneous
impression that contribution is never allowed in any case. Also,
because indemnity cases are frequently cited for contribution
principles, the ultimate result has been a breakdown in the distinctions between the two terms so that they are often used syn10 3
onymously.
Thus, when the court in Stewart v. Mister Softee of Ilinois,104 an indemnity case, stated that "[t] o combat the harshness
of a rule prohibiting contribution among tortfeasors in all cases,
Illinois courts have developed certain exceptions where indemnity
is allowed,"' 05 the court had drawn two unfounded conclusions,
250 Ill. App. 330 (1928); Chicago Rys. v. R.F. Conway Co., 219 Ill. App.
220 (1920).
98. 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 116, 198 N.E.2d 537, 542 (1964).

99. Id. at 120, 198 N.E.2d at 544.

100. The conclusion that McDonald was decided on indemnity principles is bolstered by the court's statement that "[t]his conclusion is based

on .. .the holding of the Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown case." Id.
Economy Auto was a suit for indemnity. 334 Ill. App. 579, 79 N.E.2d 854
(1948).
101. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. v. Evans Const. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 603,
208 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1965).
102. The basic exception is that the rule does not apply unless the tortfeasors acted intentionally, wilfully, or in concert.
103. In Sleck v. Butler Bros., 53 Ill. App. 2d 7, 202 N.E.2d 64 (1964),
an indemnity case, the court said at 15, 202 N.E.2d at 68:
Where a party without fault has been subjected to tort liability because of the wrongful conduct of another person, the party who is
without fault is entitled to contribution from the party primarily liable.
The court, however, was obviously speaking of indemnity rather than
contribution.
104. 75 Ill. App. 2d 328, 221 N.E.2d 11 (1966) quoting Spivack v. Hara,
69 Ill. App. 2d 22, 216 N.E.2d 173 (1966).

105. Id. at 330, 221 N.E.2d at 13.

88

The John Marshall Journal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 8:75

both based on imprecise usage and incorrect definitions. First
the court concluded that contribution among tortfeasors is prohibited in all cases. However, contribution is not prohibited in
Illinois in all cases. Secondly, the rules concerning indemnity are
independent of, not merely exceptions to, the no-contribution
rule.106
Any attempt to categorize the preceeding cases to determine
how many cases state the rule regarding contribution in dicta,
how many are in reality indemnity cases, or how many have misinterpreted the rule, would almost prove futile. It is clear, however, that the status of the supposed "rule against contribution"
in Illinois is totally confused, and that no one case holds unequivocally and squarely that contribution will not be allowed
between negligent tortfeasors who have not acted in concert. An
examination of the recent Gertz and Carver decisions exemplifies
the lack of understanding of the rule in Illinois. Such lack of
understanding often leads to the development of new theories,
as in Gertz, or to an arbitrary denial of any form of recovery,
as in Carver.
GERTZ V. CAMPBELL

THE DOCTRINE

OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT

James Gertz, a minor, was struck by an automobile driven
by Campbell, and his right leg was fractured. At the hospital,
an initial examination showed poor circulation in the leg and immediate surgery was indicated. However, Dr. Snyder, the treating physician, delayed the operation for seventeen hours; by then
the limb had become so necrotic that it had to be amputated between the ankle and the knee. Campbell filed a third party complaint against the doctor. He alleged malpractice and sought indemnity for the damages assessed against him which were attributable to the alleged malpractice, since under Illinois case law
the original tortfeasor is liable for aggravation of an injury
10 7
caused by a physician's malpractice.
The trial court had dismissed the third party complaint, apparently on the ground that Campbell was seeking contribution. 0 8 The appellate court, after first stating that contribution

106. For the distinction between contribution and indemnity, see text

accompanying notes 32-41, supra.

107. Gertz v. Campbell, 4 Ill. App. 3d 806, 807 282 N.E.2d 28, 29
(1972), citing Variety Mfg. Co. v. Landaker, 227 Ill 22, 25, 81 N.E. 47,
48 (1907); Chicago City Ry. v. Saxby, 213 Ill. 274, 276-78, 72 N.E. 755,
756 (1904). The apparent rationale for the rule is that

the unskillful treatment or malpractice by the doctor is a result or
intervening cause which reasonably ought to have been anticipated
by the tort-feasor.
Gertz v. Campbell, 4 Ill. App. 3d at 807, 282 N.E.2d at 29.
108. Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 87, 302 N.E.2d 40, 42 (1973).
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between joint tortfeasors is barred by decisional law, 10 9 decided
that the rule was not a bar to the action since the defendants
in Gertz had not committed a "joint tort."110 The defendants had
not acted in concert, the injuries were severable in point of time,
neither had control over, or an opportunity to guard against, the
acts of the other, and the causes of action were based on different
duties to plaintiff."' Therefore, the court concluded that "[biy
any meaningful test of joint responsibility there would appear
to be no basis to apply deterrent rules to prevent an equitable
apportionment of the loss between the original and the successive
wrongdoer. 1' 2 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that Campbell and Dr. Snyder were not joint tortfeasors and also that prior
Illinois holdings prohibiting contribution between joint tortfeasors were not applicable. 113
In considering Campbell's claim of a right to indemnity, the
supreme court looked to a recent New York case 1 4 which had
based an indemnity action on equitable principles. While impliedly admitting that indemnity normally shifts the entire loss
to the tortfeasor whose conduct is more culpable, 15 the court in
Gertz indicated that the right to indemnity "should be capable
of development to meet perceived requirements for just solutions
in questions involving multiple tortfeasors." 1 6 Using rather tortuous reasoning, the court held that the proposed action was not
repugnant to the notion of indemnity, because Campbell, while
not seeking indemnity for the total damages, "does seek indem117
nity for the total damages attributable to the fault of Snyder."
The court further noted that other courts have recognized "a
right in the original tortfeasor to recover for the damages caused
by the third party's malpractice."' " 8
109. Gertz v. Campbell, 4 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10, 282 N.E.2d at 30-31,
citing Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. v. Evans Const. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208
N.E.2d 573 (1965); Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 605, 175 N.E. 832, 833
(1931).
110. Gertz v. Campbell, 4 Ill. App. 3d 806, 810, 282 N.E.2d 28, 31
(1972).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 88-89, 302 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1973).
114. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972)
(involving the death of an employee while cleaning a recently fumigated
storage bin. The chemical company which manufactured the fumigant,

though allegedly negligent in failing to properly label the fumigant, was

allowed to sue the employer for an apportionment of damages).

115. Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 94, 302 N.E.2d 40, 46 (1973), Chief
Justice Underwood, specially concurring. The Chief Justice contended
that Campbell should be subrogated to the rights of the injured party
against the physician.

116. Id. at 89, 302 N.E.2d at 43.
117. Id. at 90, 302 N.E.2d at 44.
118. Id., citing Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr.
490 (1964); Clark v. Halstead, 276 App. Div. 17, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1949);
Fisher v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269
(1920). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 639 (1966).
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The supreme court and the appellate court reached the correct result in Gertz, but for the wrong reasons. Both courts correctly stated the common law and Illinois rule that there can be
no contribution among joint tortfeasors, and both correctly determined that Campbell and Snyder were not joint tortfeasors.
But neither court even considered the next logical inquiry: Is
contribution allowed among successive or concurrent negligent
tortfeasors, like Campbell and Snyder? While the status of the
law in Illinois is obviously unsettled, neither legislative action '9
nor the weight of authority 120 would bar an affirmative response
to the question.
CARVER V. GROSSMAN
"AcTIVE" NEGLIGENCE BARS INDEMNITY

To avoid the rule against contribution, Illinois courts have
defined certain situations in which indemnity will be allowed to
shift the whole loss from one tortfeasor to another. In general,
these situations "arise where the party seeking indemnity has
been guilty of only 'legal' or 'technical' negligence while the21indemnitor has committed the 'active' or 'primary' negligence.'
In Carver v. Grossman122 a customer brought his car into a
gas station for an oil change. The operator of the station drove
the car into the service bay and turned off the ignition, but left
the car in gear. While an employee was working on the. car, the
station operator asked the customer to check the gas. The customer turned on the ignition and the car lurched forward, injuring the employee.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the customer could not
maintain a third party action for indemnity against the station
operator since the customer had been guilty of "active" negligence, and indemnity is only allowed when the indemnitee's negligence is passive or arises by operation of law. 123 The court did
not mention the Gertz case, possibly because the equities here
119. The Business Corporation Act allows contribution among corpo-

rate directors, ILL.

REV. STAT.,

ch. 32, § 157.42-11 (1973); The Workmen's

Compensation Statute allows third party actions against parties jointly
liable with the employer, ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 48, § 138.5 (1973). Section
25(2) of the Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110 (1973), is discussed infra at the text accompanying notes 126-41. Some authors have
contended that that section bars contribution. See Paull, Caveat Venditor: The "Sack and Slaughter" Proceeds, 62 ILL. B. J. 328, 330 (1974).
120. Many cases cited in support of the rule state it only in dicta or
misinterpret or misapply the rule. The weight of authority in Illinois is
considered in the text accompanying notes 46-106, infra.
121. Spivack v. Hara, 69 Ill. App. 2d 22, 24, 216 N.E.2d 173, 174 (1966).
See also Stewart v. Mister Softee of Illinois, Inc., 75 Ill. App. 2d 328, 221
N.E.2d 11, 13 (1966).
122. 55 Ill. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973).
123. Id. at 511, 305 N.E.2d at 163.

1974]

Contribution Among Tortfeasors

were not as strongly in favor of the third party plaintiff as they
were in Gertz.

Even though the court had noted in dictum that the wisdom
and reason for the Illinois rule against contribution has been severely questioned, 124 the court failed to look at this case in light
of that rule. Here both tortfeasors were negligent-the station
owner in leaving the car in gear, in not blocking the wheels, and
in not applying the emergency brake; and the customer in not
depressing the clutch or taking the car out of gear before starting
it. These negligent acts combined to cause one indivisible injury
which would not have occurred without the acts of both parties.
The result in Carver seems inherently unfair in that, while both
parties were equally negligent, only one paid the entire damages
125
and the other paid nothing.
STATUTORY ENACTMENTS

An Interpretation of Section 25(2)
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act

While some states have changed or modified the common law
rule regarding contribution by legislative enactment, 126 Illinois
has not. One sentence in Section 25(2) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 127 however, has led at least one author to conclude that
contribution is barred by statute in Illinois. 12 This sentence
reads: "Nothing herein . . . creates any substantive right to contribution among tortfeasors . . . which has not heretofore
existed.' ' 29 While the Joint Committee Comments to the section

state that "[t] he last sentence is designed to allay any fears that
substantive law of contribution is sought to be changed,"' 30 the
Comments give no indication of what the Committee thinks the
substantive law of contribution is and what rights to contribution, if any, have "heretofore existed." The Historical & Practice
Notes' 8 ' to the section are also of no help in interpreting the sentence, since they simply point out that the sentence does not af132
fect those situations where indemnity is available.
124. Id. at 510-11, 305 N.E.2d at 162.
125. See text accompanying note 145, infra.
126 See PROSSER, TORTS, § 50 and Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955), 9 U.L.A. 127 (1967 Pocket Part).
127. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, § 25 (2) (1973).
128. Paull, Caveat Venditor: The "Sack and Slaughter" Proceeds, 62
ILL. B.J. 328, 330 (1974). It should be noted, however, that the statute
does not "bar" anything.
129. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, § 25 (2) (1973).
130. S.H.A., ch. 110, § 25(2), 289 (1968).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 290:
While the last sentence of subsection (2) warns that no substantive right of contribution among tort-feasors is created, it should be
remembered that there are situations in which one tort-feasor de-
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Five cases 8 ' have mentioned this section of the statute but
they provide little aid in construing it. Two of the cases,

1 5
McDonald v. Trampsf1 4 and Coffey v. ABC Liquor Stores, 3
merely reiterate the Joint Committee Comments. Carver v.
Grossman8 6 and Miller v. DeWitt'37 only mention the section to
point out its effect, or lack thereof, on principles of indemnity.
Finally, while Holcomb v. Flavin determines that the section only
applies to "joint" tortfeasors, 18 the court's definition of "joint
tortfeasor" could easily apply to concurrent or successive tortfeasors as well.

The logical and reasonable interpretation of section 25(2) is
that it reflects the Legislature's recognition that a procedural
rule regarding joinder of parties has no effect on the substantive
meanings of "joint tort" and "joint liability." Had this point
been clearly made in the mid-1800's when the codification of rules
of joinder muddied the concept of "jointness," much of the confusion in this area of the law would not exist today. 8 9 If this interpretation is accepted, then the section of the statute has no
effect on any rules regarding contribution among concurrent or
successive negligent tortfeasors.
It should be noted that no overriding public policy prohibiting contribution appears to exist since the Legislature has alfendant can recover indemnification from another tort-feasor and
that this subsection may be utilized in those instances.
Despite this "clarification" it has been said that the "statute also prohibits third-party indemnity claims for 'contribution among tortfeasors.'"
Feirich, supra note 37, at 246.
133. Carver v. Grossman, 55 I1. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973); Miller
v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965); McDonald v. Trampf,
49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 198 N.E.2d 537 (1964); Holcomb v. Flavin, 37 Ill. App.
2d 359, 185 N.E.2d 716 (1962); Coffey v. ABC Liquor Stores, 13 111. App.
2d 510, 142 N.E.2d 705 (1957).
134. 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 198 N.E.2d 537 (1964).
135. 13 Ill. App. 2d 510, 142 N.E.2d 705 (1957). In McDonald the court
said:
Paragraph 2 of section 25 was designed to allay any fears that the
substantive law of contribution was sought to be changed or that the
question of liability insurance could be injected into an action. The
recent case of Coffey v. ABC Liquor Stores, Inc., [citations omitted]
makes this clear.
49 Ill. App. 2d at 109, 198 N.E.2d at 539. However, the Coffey case did
not expressly discuss the section in question.
136. 55 Ill. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973).
137. 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965).
138. 37 Ill. App. 2d 359, 362, 185 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1962):
While the Illinois Act authorizing the third party complaint specifically provides that nothing in the Act creates any substantive right
to contribute among tort-feasors, such provision obviously relates to
joint tort-feasors, that is, those whose concurrent acts of [sic] omissions combine to cause the injury.
The court's determination that the section refers to joint tortfeasors is
probably correct, even though the subsequent definition is not.
139. For a discussion of this point, see the text accompanying notes 1625, supra,
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lowed it, or its equivalent, in several instances. 140 Also the supreme court's statement in Carver that "[w]hether the time has
arrived or conditions are ripe for a modification of this rule
through judicial decision or legislative enactment is.

.

. not rele-

vant"'' would seem to indicate that the court feels that the Legislature has not yet acted, through section 25 (2) or otherwise, and
that judicial decision is still possible.
CONCLUSION

Gertz and Carver Revisited
Ever since Merryweather, courts and legal scholars have
wrestled with the definitions of such terms as "contribution," "indemnity," "joint tort," and "joint tortfeasors." It would be pretentious to propose here a set of definitions of those terms which
would purport to fit all possible situations. It is evident, however, that only such a set of definitions, laid down by the Illinois
Supreme Court, will resolve the conflict and confusion surrounding those terms in Illinois case law.
Even without explicit definitions, much of the confusion
would end if the courts would simply recognize the elementary
distinctions between indemnity and contribution, and use these
terms in their proper context. As discussed previously, indemnity involves the shifting of the entire loss from one tortfeasor
to another, while contribution involves a sharing of the loss, with
each tortfeasor paying only a proportionateshare. Contribution
is founded on principles of equity. Indemnity arises by contract,
either express, or implied, as in the case of a master and servant,
or implied by law, as where one tortfeasor who has been passively negligent is liable by operation of law for damages caused
14 2
by the overt and direct negligence of another.
In both Gertz and Carver the tortfeasors were found not to
be joint tortfeasors 148 but the courts then failed to further classify them. Perhaps the problems of apportionment of damages
would have been clearer if the court in those cases had distinguished between three kinds of tortfeasors:
Joint tortfeasors-those who have acted intentionally or in
concert to injure' a third party.
140. Contribution is allowed between corporate directors by the Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 32, § 157.42-11 (1973). Third

party actions against persons jointly liable with the employer are allowed under the workmen's compensation statute. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 48,

§ 138.5 (1973).

141. Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973).
142. See generally text accompanying notes 32-41, supra.

143. The finding was express in Gertz and at least strongly implied
inCarver.
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Concurrent tortfeasors-those whose independent, negligent
acts combined or concurred at one point in time to injure a third
party.
Successive tortfeasors-those whose independent, negligent
acts, though severable in point of time, caused injury to the same
third party.
Historically, contribution, or an equitable apportionment of
damages, was denied between joint tortfeasors because their concerted action created a mutual agency, making the acts of one
the acts of the other. Each was therefore liable for the whole
damage. 144 In cases involving negligent tortfeasors, apportionment was sometimes denied, not because of the jointness of their
actions, but because of the indivisibility of the injury. Divisibility of the damage was not at all dependent on the type of tortfeasors who caused it. The victim's death, which was indivisible,
could have been caused by successive negligent tortfeasors, by
concurrently negligent tortfeasors, or by intentional tortfeasors.
Similarly, divisible injuries could have been caused by any of the
above sets of tortfeasors with, for example, one tortfeasor fracturing the victim's skull and the other breaking his leg.
Between concurrent or successive tortfeasors whose acts had
caused one indivisible injury, the refusal to apportion was predicated on the fact that no logical basis for an apportionment
existed-the court or jury could not say with any reasonable degree of accuracy how much of the injury was caused by any one
tortfeasor. Since either party's act could be considered the proximate cause of the injury, either could be held liable for the entire damages. But as Dean Prosser states:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which
permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants
were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto
one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim
or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the
latter goes scot free. 145
In cases involving successive tortfeasors there can be no objection that the damages are not severable because they are severable in point of time. It is possible, in theory at least, to determine where one tort stopped and the other started. While
"[a] s a practical matter, it may be difficult or impossible to produce satisfactory evidence as to the extent of the damages caused
by each,'146 this difficulty hardly warrants holding one tortfeasor liable for damages with which he was not connected.
144. See generally PROSSER, TORTS, 315.
145. Id. at 307.
146. Prosser, supra note 5, at 434-35.
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In any event, whether the injury is truly indivisible or
whether the evidence is insufficient to make an accurate division,
there would appear to be no good reason why the court could
not find that the "defendants are equally responsible, and the
'147
damages may be divided equally between them.
Denying an apportionment of damages among such negligent
tortfeasors has the practical effect of "providing legal, although
non-criminal punishment for negligent acts,' 1 48 while failing to
provide "reasonable, legally sanctioned, modes for distributing
' 49
the risk of tort liability.'
The result in Carver, therefore, was arguably incorrect. The
parties were concurrent tortfeasors and although the injury they
caused was indivisible, the damages could have been divided in
half. As the case stands, one tortfeasor was charged totally for
an injury which would never have occurred, but for the simultaneous negligence of another.
While the result in Gertz was correct, the supreme court
missed a golden opportunity to clarify the statusa of the "rule
against contribution" in Illinois. The appellate court's "equitable
apportionment" and the supreme court's "partial indemnity"
were equivalent to an allowance of contribution between successive tortfeasors. Case law should not have been muddied further
by the introduction of these two new phrases for an old concept.
Don C. Hammer

147. Id. at 439.
148. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, 1372 (1958).
149. Id. See also HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTs, 717 (1956),
where the comment is made that the limitations placed on contribution
seem illogical.

